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On the Importance of Impostors
Orson Welles’ F for Fake as Nietzschean Film?
The Impostor is the blender par excellence. She is both herself and someone else, 
and therefore properly neither. As a rejection of the limits between I and Other, her 
actions might be embraced as an ultimate form of kinship, but are often frowned 
upon, particularly in the world-as-law, and in an age of identity politics which 
encourages the dissolution of identity while simultaneously censuring its usurpa-
tion. A sense of imposture is something with which many (particularly female) 
academics will be intimately familiar. It is part of that ‘bad conscience’ (which 
Nietzsche describes in his Genealogy of Morality of 1887 as an anger directed 
towards the self, a “Selbstpeinigung”1) that emerges from the foundational prin-
ciple of originality of thought on which academia has erected itself, an original-
ity enshrined in the tabernacle of the mono graph. This essay speaks directly to its 
author’s on-going imposture, and concomitant “Selbstpeinigung”, but in the hope 
of redeeming impostors and their work for the academy.
With this in mind, I examine here the concept of the fake; specifically, how it is 
harnessed, or rather borrowed, by Orson Welles in his film F for Fake (1974) to take 
issue with the idea of originality, and its supposed corollary, truth. While the associ-
ation of truth with originality may seem quaintly old-fashioned in an age of infinite 
digital reproducibility and enhanceability, it is a stubborn association, nonetheless. 
Perhaps precisely because truth in a virtual era is in a state of infinite regress, we 
presume now more than ever upon that alliance of truth and art that Keats so ada-
mantly expressed as “Beauty is truth, truth beauty, – that is all / Ye know on earth, 
and all ye need to know.”2 It is an equation the fame-hungry Romantics extended to 
include originality. In other words, to borrow from C.S. Lewis, not only is beauty 
synonymous with truth, but “in literature and art […] if you simply try to tell the 
truth […] you will, nine times out of ten, become original.”3 According to this pre-
vailing syllogism, no great art can be false, and no great art can be unoriginal; there-
1 Friedrich Nietzsche: “Genealogie der Moral”. In: Friedrich Nietzsche: Sämtliche Werke. 
Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA). Ed. by Gorgio Colli, Mazzino Montinari. Vol. II/2. Ber-
lin, München: de Gruyter, 2010, p. 297.
2 John Keats: “Ode on a Grecian Urn”. In: John Keats: The Complete Poems. Harmonds-
worth: Penguin, 1988, p. 334.
3 Quoted in Corey Latta: C. S. Lewis and the Art of Writing. Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 
2016, p. 165.
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fore, great art is always both original and true, and, in fact, art, truth and originality 
are coterminous. It is a notion perpetuated by the academy, expressed, amongst 
other things, as an antipathy to plagiarism. And on the art market, as an antipathy 
to fakes. In both cases, the untrue is understood by self-appointed custodians of 
beauty and art to be a crime.
Welles is not interested in the crime of fakery as such, turning his attention 
instead to the moment of “discovery” of fakery, when the fake is declared to be 
or revealed as a fake. This, according to Welles’ 1974 essay film, is the real crime 
because it places the fake back in an unwinnable truth-game, or under the sign of 
truth. The moment of discovery – the resumption of disbelief, as it were – returns 
the fake to a pre-Nietzschean world demarcated by discourses of truth and reality 
and originality. Importantly, however, it is a world in which we are condemned to 
an eternal state of mourning for these lost (because ultimately unattainable) things. 
In Cinéma 2, Gilles Deleuze reads Welles’ work as Nietzschean in precisely this 
sense. But this contribution re-examines Deleuze’s Nietzschean reading of Welles, 
arguing instead that the final scene of the film belies this interpretation. Welles, 
according to Deleuze, escapes or by-passes the doubt-certainty, truth-lies, illusion-
real dichotomies that have marked Western thought since Plato, demonstrating the 
inapplicability and danger of these tropes, and demonstrating the existentially vital 
life-affirming escape-artistry offered by illusion.
Orson Welles’ 88-minute film-essay about truth and lies, F for Fake, almost 
the last film he was to complete, started life very differently. It began as a more or 
less straightforward BBC documentary project by the French film-maker François 
Reichenbach about a prolific Hungarian-born art forger going by the name of Elmyr 
de Hory, who had at various points in his life also used the pseudonyms Elmyr 
Herzog, Elmyr Hoffman, Baron Elmyr von Houry, Louis Cassou and Joseph Dory, 
to name but a few, and if sources are to be believed. When he came to Reichenbach’s 
attention in 1969, Elmyr, as we shall call him for convenience,4 was living in not 
inconsiderable if borrowed style on the island of Ibiza, enjoying the celebrity of a 
succès de scandale. His new-found fame, or notoriety, as some might prefer to see 
it, was due in part to his arrest the previous year by Spanish police on a range of 
rather risible charges including homosexuality, consorting with known criminals, 
and having no visible means of support, for which convictions he served a jail sen-
tence of a few months. In fact, these charges were incidental, but the only ones for 
which the authorities had any evidence. His real crime lay in his genius for artistic 
replication, which is harder to pinpoint. Elmyr was only able to paint passably well 
4 His real name is possibly Elemer Albert Hoffmann, at least according to documents 
‘discovered’ in a French farmhouse in 2011. Source apocryphal. See Eve M. Kahn: 
“Gleaning the True Identity of an Enigmatic Forger”. In: New York Times, 07.04.2011, 
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/08/arts/design/elmyr-de-horys-real-identity-its-
becoming-less-of-a-mystery.html (accessed 04.10.2021).
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in his own right, or at least the art market thought so, but could produce extraor-
dinary and extraordinarily convincing works in the unique style of various great 
artists. 
This is, of course not a crime in itself (and was therefore also something he 
never openly denied). But it became one by an extension of that same uncanny 
gift for imitation: Elmyr was also able to replicate accurately the signatures of the 
famous artists whose styles he mimicked. Specifically, it was these auto graphs that 
were the site of the crime in a way, for it was their addition – this underwriting of 
the painting with a forged name – that brought the act into the domain of the law, 
acting as it did as an affidavit of authenticity. (Lacanians might see this act of intro-
ducing names and therefore language to the painting as necessarily involving an 
entry into the symbolic and therefore legal order.) At any rate, these names made 
marketable fakes of what otherwise would have been nothing more than derivative 
paintings. The canvasses were transformed by the magic of the signature into items 
of huge artistic and monetary value and thus judicial concern, and were sold on as 
the newly discovered works of famous artists by dealers who were only too willing 
to suspend any disbelief about their provenance. So, it was at the point of signature 
that things became serious, and therefore, of course, the addition of artists’ signa-
tures was a point on which the otherwise dangerously garrulous Elmyr needed to 
remain prudently silent.5
As Walter Benjamin pointed out in his essay on Baudelaire, the signature is 
one of “the most decisive of all conquests of a person’s incognito”,6 surpassed only 
by the photo graphic or mechanical reproduction. While Benjamin correctly recog-
nizes the signature’s identificatory and thus policing power, this power is, of course, 
one that is only vested in the signature and not a power of the signature per se. 
For, as Derrida points out, the signature does not actually, as it promises to, bind 
expressions of whatever form to their one true source or origin. Although the signa-
ture claims and underwrites uniqueness of origin, in fact, the very singularity and 
originality that signatures seem to vouchsafe, is, says Derrida in “Signature, Event, 
Context” (1971), precisely impossible, amongst other things because a signature, in 
order to be authentic and authenticated, has to be repeatable, which implies that it 
5 F for Fake 01:03:41–01:05:37. 
6 “Am Anfang des Identifikationsverfahrens […] steht die Personalbestimmung durch 
Unterschrift. In der Geschichte dieses Verfahrens stellt die Erfindung der Photo graphie 
einen Einschnitt dar. Sie bedeutet für die Kriminalistik nicht weniger als die des Buch-
drucks für das Schrifttum bedeutet hat. Die Photo graphie ermöglicht zum ersten Mal, 
für die Dauer und eindeutig Spuren von einem Menschen festzuhalten. Die Detektivge-
schichte entsteht in dem Augenblick, da diese einschneidenste aller Eroberungen über 
das Inkognito des Menschen gesichert war.” Walter Benjamin: “Das Paris des Second 
Empire bei Baudelaire”. In: Walter Benjamin: Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. 1. Ed. by Rolf 
Tiedemann, Hermann Schweppenhäuser. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1989, pp. 511–604, 
here p. 550.
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is reproducible. “In order to function, that is, in order to be legible, a signature must 
have a repeatable, iterable, imitable form; it must be able to detach itself from the 
present and singular intention of its production. It is its sameness which, in altering 
its identity and singularity, divides the seal.”7
In an earlier and different kind of discourse on the question of the signature 
as evidence, Jeremy Bentham’s “Modes of Authentication in the Case of Written 
Evidence” [pub. 1843] also recognized that scientifically establishing identity on 
the basis of handwriting relied somewhat paradoxically on reproducibility – at least 
two samples of the same hand need to be compared (“similitude of hands”).8 In 
other words, in order to function as a mark of singularity, the same signature needs 
to be reproduced identically at least twice; preferably, of course, by the same per-
son, but quite possibly by the successful, that is to say, undiscovered, forger. For 
our context, it is interesting to note that it is the signature itself then that provides 
the possibility of forgery inasmuch as it is a reproducible singularity, the point at 
which the ideas of the unique and the copy are of critical importance and at the 
same time seem to collapse into one another. In other words, while the juridico-
legal status of the signature as proof of identity is what made a crime of Elmyr’s 
paintings, ironically, it is the signature’s reproducibility (the fact that it has to be an 
ongoing facsimile of itself, allowing copyability), that allowed the fraud in the first 
place. Were it not for the authenticity-granting power of signatures, there would be 
no fraud.
So, the police had no real evidence that Elmyr had perpetrated any acts of fraud. 
How could they? In the hands of such a master craftsman, who could tell the origi-
nal signatures from the fakes anyway? And Elmyr’s crime only really mattered to 
any of the parties involved if and when the deception was exposed. Until such time, 
there was no depreciation of the canvasses’ value, no harm to the experts who had 
staked their reputations on their authenticity, no harm to the viewer, no victim, 
therefore no injury, and by extension, arguably, no crime.
To the contrary. So great was the enthusiasm of dealers at the prospect of find-
ing new paintings by old Masters (and selling them), that experts allegedly vali-
dated thousands of these canvasses as authentic, and subsequently, as we have seen, 
refused to testify against Elmyr lest the aura of their expertise evaporate in the 
criminal dock. Thus, on countless museum walls (or so Elmyr claims in Welles’ bor-
rowed documentary footage), were hanging and probably still hang Elmyr Monets, 
Elmyr Manets, Elmyr Picassos and Elmyr Modiglianis. Of course, just how many 
famous fakes were and are hanging where, is impossible to tell not only because of 
7 Jacques Derrida: “Signature, Event, Context”. In: Jacques Derrida: Basic Writings. Ed. by 
Barry Stoker. Transl. by Alan Bass. London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 105–134, here p. 132.
8 Jeremy Bentham: “Modes of Authentication in the Case of Written Evidence”. In: John 
Bowring (published under the superintendence of his executor): The Works of Jeremy 
Bentham. Vol. VII. Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838–1843, pp. 175–180, here p. 177.
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the purported quality of the forgeries and the signatures, but because Elmyr was as 
inventive with his own bio graphy as he was with his canvasses, and was aided and 
abetted in his autobio graphical flights of fancy by an accomplice worthy of himself, 
a man who was only introduced to the film’s plot as a character in his own right 
when Welles took over the production.
When Elmyr was released from jail a few short months after his arrest, his 
exploits brought him to the attention not only of Reichenbach, but also an American 
author, Clifford Irving, also an habitué of Ibiza and (apparently, at least: creative 
splicing may have been involved) one of Elmyr’s exasperated interlocutors in a 
central sequence in which Elmyr remains stubbornly silent on the question of signa-
tures. Irving befriended Elmyr, interviewing him for Reichenbach’s “original” BBC 
documentary, and then published the interviews himself in 1969 in a work entitled 
Fake!, a title that would all too soon have quite different significance for its author. 
It is at this point that the Wellesian phase of the film begins: the tale of Elmyr as 
filmed by Reichenbach is interwoven in Welles’ montage with that of Elmyr’s bio-
grapher, Irving who, perhaps inspired by his former subject’s successes, went on to 
become a forger in his own right, but a literary one.
In 1972, shortly after completing his book on Elmyr, Irving became embroiled 
in a scandal for which he served 17 months in prison. He had received the then enor-
mous advance of $750,000 from publishing house McGraw-Hill for an authorized 
bio graphy of the recluse billionaire Howard Hughes, whom, according to Irving, he 
had met amongst some pre-Aztec ruins in Mexico to clinch the deal. Apparently, in 
1970 Irving had sent Hughes a copy of his Elmyr book, his “true tale of a Hungarian 
art forger,” as he called it, allegedly prompting Hughes to write back and suggest a 
similar work on his own life. In this letter, forged by Irving on yellow legal pad, per-
haps even (if not probably) with the help of the handwriting expert Elmyr, Hughes 
interestingly draws parallels between himself and the Hungarian con-artist, which 
should perhaps have alerted readers to the fact that Irving’s Hughes was as much 
an invention as Elmyr’s own persona. In the words of the letter if not of Hughes 
himself: “It seems to me that you have portrayed your man with great consideration 
and sympathy, when it would have been tempting to do otherwise. For reasons you 
may readily understand, this has impressed me.”9
The choice of Hughes as a subject was ingenious on Irving’s part. It would be 
difficult to prove any fraud when the subject himself was so notoriously withdrawn 
and unlikely to be available for verification. In a version of Russell’s hypothetical 
teapot circling the sun, Hughes’ secret life meant that little was definitively known 
9 It becomes a little bit difficult for the present author to provide accurate citations for 
Hughes’ work as publication data is made problematic by the fact that this was a hoax. 
Clifford Irving [and “Howard Hughes”]: The Autobio graphy of Howard Hughes. Confes-
sions of an Unhappy Billionaire. New York: McGraw Hill, 1971. Cited here from the 
Kindle edition from 2021 (using the 1999 edition), p. 4. 
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about him, making inventions both possible, plausible, and indeed desirable, for 
there is nothing like a gap to generate an interest in filling it. It was also difficult to 
uncover Irving’s forgery because, as a Time Magazine article of early 1972 pointed 
out, its “atmosphere of verisimilitude” came not from the pieces of supporting 
evidence presented by Irving, but rather from “the words in the manuscript itself. 
Several experienced editors and publishers at McGraw-Hill and LIFE magazine had 
read Irving’s work and found it convincing in its tone […]. It had an undeniable 
smack of authenticity.”10 Ironically, this very authenticity of tone and wording was 
due to the fact that the forgery was a double fraud, its verisimilitude apparently fur-
ther increasing its remove from originality. Irving had, namely, not only lied about 
his subject, and forged Hughes’ signature; he had stolen much of the detail that 
lent the work its convincing aura from a text by a certain James Phelan. Phelan had 
ghostwritten an unpublished memoire about Hughes on behalf of Noah Dietrich, 
Hughes’ former chief aide, CEO of his business empire, and custodian of what 
the world knew of his reclusive boss. The genius of Irving’s theft was that, until 
their falling out in the late 1950s, Noah Dietrich had created, forged, as it were, his 
boss’s entire public persona for him. So, what sounded like Dietrich, also automati-
cally sounded like Hughes. As G. Thomas Couser puts it in his study of authority in 
autobio graphical writing, Altered Egos: 
Brusque, rude, and impatient, [Dietrich] is many things that Howard Hughes 
is not. But he had also been, for most of his working life, Howard Hughes’s 
public stand-in. What the outside world had seen and known of Hughes had 
mostly come via Noah Dietrich […]. All Clifford Irving needed to do was to put 
the thoughts of Noah Dietrich into the mouth of Howard Hughes (as Noah had 
done for so many years), and he had the material for a rich, literary property.11
So, because the Hughes the world had known was never really himself to begin 
with, the invented Hughes of Irving and Dietrich had no original with which to 
compete. Hughes was a mere outline into which anything could be filled, forming 
the plausible substance of the figure.
In one particularly interesting passage of the bio graphy, Irving has Hughes 
accuse his ex-aide Dietrich of being a liar, saying: “Noah Dietrich, now that he 
no longer works for me, has told story after story about our past business dealings 
where he’s twisted things around.”12 A nice little touch, perhaps designed to put any 
detective off the scent of Irving’s plagiarism of Dietrich via Phelan. But, as Irving 
himself put it to TIME magazine upon its discovery of the fraud, “It’s more complex 
10 “The Fabulous Hoax of Clifford Irving”. In: TIME 99/8, 21.02.1972, pp. 12–21, here p. 12.
11 G. Thomas Couser: Altered Egos. Authority in American Autobio graphy. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 296.
12 Irving [and “Howard Hughes”]: The Autobio graphy of Howard Hughes, p. 278. 
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than you ever think. […] You haven’t seen the bottom line yet.”13 One can only 
speculate about what Irving’s deliberately cryptic remark meant – perhaps he was 
alluding to the ever-receding horizon of truth in postmodern times that is so often 
referred to, or maybe the infinite regress of veracity that the paradox of the forged 
forgery unleashes. At any rate, he was right about the situation’s complexity.
For one thing, there was the conundrum posed by the artistic caliber of Irving’s 
achievement. As TIME magazine remarked, noting the parallels between Irving and 
Elmyr de Hory, the forgery was undeniably superior not only to the original but also 
in comparison to Irving’s real books. 
One curiosity: the writing in the Irving manuscript is much better than that in 
the hastily drafted Phelan version. It is ironic that Irving may be more con-
vincing as a forger than as an author in his own right – just as Elmyr de Hory, 
Irving’s Ibiza friend and the main character in his book Fake!, is much better at 
doing Picassos and Modiglianis than he is at doing de Horys.14
And, if the Elmyr-Irving-Hughes situation weren’t complex enough in itself, Welles’ 
film about them deliberately introduces further complexity and uncertainty to the 
admixture. For one thing, the film’s own originality and truth-content are fore-
grounded from the start as being highly questionable. The film opens with a magic 
trick, performed by Welles at a station, to an audience of a small boy. As Welles’ 
scholar Jonathan Rosenbaum noted at time of the film’s release, “a few rumblings 
have already been heard to the effect that FAKE is ‘not really a Welles film.’”15 And 
in the strictest sense, it is not. Welles not only took over Reichenbach’s documen-
tary footage of Elmyr and Irving, but also completely reedited it, and filmed and 
inserted his own factual and fictional material.16
It is also important to note that Welles’ version of the original is no longer a 
documentary about Elmyr. It is, in fact, a completely different genre of film, a film-
essay, “a pure late-modern creation”, according to András Kovács in Screening 
Modernism which focuses on putting forward a line of argument, while eschew-
ing the “topochronological” conventions we associate with mainstream cinema.17 
13 Time: The Fabulous Hoax, p. 15.
14 Time: The Fabulous Hoax, p. 15.
15 Jonathan Rosenbaum: “First Impressions of F for Fake”. In: Jonathan Rosenbaum (ed.): 
Discovering Orson Welles. Berkley: University of California Press, 2007, pp. 51–53, 
here p. 51.
16 Ironically, in a mirror image of this, the footage from Welles’ failed 1940s documentary 
about South America, which became a film essay on samba, was reedited and embedded 
into the 1993 Wilson-Meisel-Krohn documentary about Welles. The documentary maker 
entitled it It’s All True.
17 András Bálint Kovács: Screening Modernism. European Art Cinema, 1950–1980. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 2007, p. 117.
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According to Peter Bogdanovich’s description of the film, “it is as though you [had] 
said to Orson Welles, what do you have to say about the subject of fakery, art for-
gery, charlatanism, magicianship, the idea of authorship and experts[?]”18
The first part of the 88-minute film, lasting almost exactly 60 minutes, follows 
the original storyline to a degree, using the extraordinary events linking Elmyr, 
Irving and Hughes to reveal that everyone is a fake, from the so-called art experts 
who couldn’t and/or wouldn’t reveal the frauds, down to Welles himself. To estab-
lish Welles himself as a fraud, the film even includes an excerpt from the phony 
1930s War of the Worlds broadcast, or at least it seems to, because, of course, the 
included excerpt is itself a fake, a reconstruction, matching none of the dialogue 
in the original. After this hour in which Welles has elegantly traced various pat-
terns on this fabric of lies, we enter the film’s second part, which Welles calls “a 
reenactment of recent history” (01:08:31–01:08:33). In these final 20 minutes or 
so, Welles seems to depart from the original plot entirely, telling the apparently 
true story of a summer love affair between Picasso and Welles’ then mistress and 
costar of F for Fake, Oja Kodar. The affair, Welles tells us, resulted in “22 large 
portraits of Ms Oja Kodar […] born under that virile brush” (01:15:20–01:15:28). 
When the affair ended, Welles explains, Kodar took the paintings with her, demand-
ing that “all of those pictures, all 22 of them, were to be hers, outright, her prop-
erty, Oja’s very own, to pick up and carry away” (01:15:57–01:16:09). Not in the 
habit of donating paintings, Picasso had reluctantly bestowed them with the single 
caveat that none of them were ever to be sold (01:12:54–01:18:01). Picasso was 
then furious to discover a short time later that a new Picasso show was about to 
be held in Paris. Presuming the exhibited paintings to be those he had given to 
Kodar, he rushed there in a rage, but upon entering the exhibition was stunned to 
find that not one of the pictures over which all Paris was in a frenzy of admiration 
had been painted by him. “Critics were hailing the freshness, the force, the fecun-
dity” (01:17:47–01:17:51) of this new Picasso period, but it was not his work. By 
way of explanation, Kodar promptly whisked the flabbergasted artist away to visit 
her dying grandfather, who, we are told, is coincidentally both a Hungarian and a 
forger just like Elmyr. Kodar’s grandfather is, allegedly, the most masterful forger 
of his day, a positive Macavity amongst fakers, and has painted all these critically 
acclaimed new Picassos, burning the 22 real, not-for-sale Picassos given to Kodar. 
In this reenacted encounter between Grandfather Kodar and Picasso, with Welles 
playing Grandfather and Oja playing Picasso – and sometimes vice versa – the 
dying grandfather asks: “Do you think I should confess? To what? To committing 
masterpieces?” (01:23:49–01:23:55).
18 “Peter Bogdanovic on F for Fake”, clip at: https://www.criterion.com/current/posts/3344-
peter-bogdanovich-on-f-for-fake (accessed 24.06.2021). 
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Then suddenly, three minutes from the end of the film, the real Welles inter-
rupts the reenactment at Grandfather’s deathbed-side to announce that it is “time 
for a confession. […] For the past 17 minutes, I have been lying my head off” 
(01:26:36–01:26:40). Despite its similarities to the true, or at least truer, Elmyr 
story, the tale of the 22 Picassos and Oja’s grandfather, is, he now claims, a com-
plete fabrication. Welles however, excuses his deception, his departure from reality 
and seeming failure to uphold the promise he had made at the beginning of the film 
to base everything for “the next hour” strictly on the available facts. He argues 
against the imperative to be truthful and to represent reality faithfully, claiming 
that: 
Reality is the toothbrush waiting at home for you in its glass. A bus ticket. A 
paycheck. And the grave. In the right mood perhaps, Elmyr has just as few 
regrets as I have to have been a charlatan. But we’re not so proud either of us 
as to lay any superior claim to being very much worse than the rest of you. [...] 
What we professional liars hope to serve is truth. I believe the pompous word 
for that is “art”. Picasso himself said it. “Art”, he said, “is a lie, a lie that makes 
us realize the truth”. (01:26:57–01:27:45).
This cannot fail to remind us of the famous passage from Nietzsche’s Nachlaß: 
“Die Wahrheit ist häßlich. Wir haben die Kunst, damit wir nicht an der Wahrheit 
zugrunde gehn.”19 Another version of the aphorism is offered in Die fröhliche 
Wissenschaft (1887), where honesty is described as bringing only “Ekel und den 
Selbstmord […]. Nun aber hat unsere Redlichkeit eine Gegenmacht, die uns sol-
chen Consequenzen ausweichen hilft: die Kunst.”20 And had Welles encouraged us 
to place any trust in bio graphies, we might note at this point that, according to his 
bio graphers, Welles had read all of Shakespeare and much of Nietzsche even before 
he went to school at the age of ten. Allegedly.21
Bio graphical evidence for the Nietzsche connection aside, Gilles Deleuze saw 
Welles’ treatment of truth as very much in the tradition of, if not borrowed directly 
from, Nietzsche, asserting in Cinéma II that 
Orson Welles […] makes the image go over to the power of the false. […] 
There is a Nietzscheanism in Welles, as if Welles were retracing the main 
points of Nietzsche’s critique of truth: the ‘true world’ does not exist, and, if it 
19 Friedrich Nietzsche: Nachgelassene Fragmente: Anfang 1888–Anfang Januar 1889. In 
Nietzsche: KSA. Vol. VIII. 1972, fragment no. 822, p. 269.
20 Friedrich Nietzsche: “Die fröhliche Wissenschaft”. In: Nietzsche: KSA. Vol. III. 1980, 
pp. 343–638, here p. 464.
21 Erik Barnouw: The Golden Web. A History of Broadcasting in the United States. Vol. 2: 
1933–1953. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 84.
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did, would be inaccessible, impossible to describe, and if it could be described, 
would be useless, superfluous.22 
Or as Nietzsche had put it in a passage from his Götzen-Dämmerung (1895), “Die 
‘wahre Welt’ – eine Idee, die zu nichts mehr nütz ist, nicht einmal mehr verpflich-
tend – eine unnütz, eine überflüssig gewordene Idee, folglich eine widerlegte 
Idee: schaffen wir sie ab!”23 There are, in short, according to Deleuze, clear par-
allels between Nietzsche’s idea of truth as nothing more than a mobile army of 
metaphors,24 and Welles’ self-deconstructing claim that “[in F for Fake] I said I was 
a charlatan and didn’t mean it […]. I was faking even then. Everything was a lie. 
There wasn’t anything that wasn’t.”25 But what do we gain by establishing a vague 
genealogy of ideas from Welles back to Nietzsche? According to Deleuze, at the 
moment when film puts truth into crisis, cinema has become Nietzschean, and, he 
says, this moment was brought about by, amongst others, Welles. 
However, in the context of Welles’ alleged inauguration of a Nietzschean cin-
ema under the sign of the false, we have to account for Welles’ openness about his 
fakery – for this truth is the one thing that does not fit with the whole programme of 
lying that we have uncovered here. And it is on this point that Welles’ project differs 
from those of Elmyr and Irving. It is his openness, I argue, that points us to the one 
real crime here.
Let us go back to our examination of when precisely a forgery becomes a crime: 
a forgery is, following Robert Hopkins’ definition “a work produced […] with the 
intention that it pass for some other individual or as belonging to some type, where 
there is a practice of valuing such things […] as the product of a certain agent.” He 
continues, “successful forgeries are those where the intention to mislead is itself 
successful.”26 By this logic, there is no crime unless the forgery is not a success – 
for, as the value rests on the work’s attribution to an individual, only the discovery 
of fake agency could damage the work’s value. Equally and oppositely, a failed 
forgery would be a crime. In other words, the act of discovery is the problem, for it 
is this that causes the devaluation both of art, truth and expertise. And, so Hopkins’ 
22 Gilles Deleuze: Cinema 2. The Time-Image. Trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert 
Galeta. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, p. 137. 
23 Friedrich Nietzsche: “Wie die ‘wahre Welt’ endlich zur Fabel wurde: Geschichte eines 
Irrtums”. In: Friedrich Nietzsche: Götzen-Dämmerung. KSA. Vol. VI. 1988, pp. 80f., 
here p. 81.
24 Friedrich Nietzsche: “Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinn”. In: Friedrich 
Nietzsche: KSA. Vol. I. 1967, p. 881.
25 Quoted in Joseph McBride: What Ever Happened to Orson Welles? A Portrait of an 
Independent Career. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006, p. 247.
26 Robert Hopkins: “Forgery”. In: Stephen Davies, Kathleen Marie Higgins, Robert Hop-
kins, Robert Stecker, David E. Cooper (eds): A Companion to Aesthetics. 2nd Edition. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 2009, pp. 287–289, here p. 287.
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claim that “forging is wrong – or so […] the sanctions against it suggest,”27 would 
surely need to be rephrased as: ‘forging is wrong when discovered – and so the 
sanctions against it would seem to be sanctions rather against its discovery.’
Since Elmyr finally poisoned himself rather than face conviction for forgery (an 
ironic inversion of the death by self-poisoning of Socrates for a kind of pathological 
truthfulness), and we can discount Irving’s claims that he had always intended his 
fraud to be discovered, and that, as such, his bio graphy of Hughes was not a fraud 
but a hoax, of our film’s three main charlatans, only one openly calls himself a liar, 
and as such is the only one who is engaged in a process of discovery and therefore 
is the only one who violates that sanction against discovery, committing a crime 
(albeit a Nietzschean crime). But what is that crime? According to Nietzsche this 
reentry into a discourse of truth and lies is a rejection of life: 
Hätten wir nicht die Künste gut gehießen und diese Art von Cultus des Unwah-
ren erfunden: so wäre die Einsicht in die allgemeine Unwahrheit und Verlo-
genheit, die uns durch diese Wissenschaft gegeben wird, nicht auszuhalten.28
Disgust and suicide would necessarily follow in truth’s train. Or as Deleuze had put 
it: “The truthful man in the end wants nothing other than to judge life; he holds up a 
superior value, the good, in the name of which he will be able to judge, he is craving 
to judge, he sees in life an evil, a fault which is to be atoned for.”29 Perhaps, as this 
is one of Welles’ last films (his second-last completed ʻfeature film’), a film that is 
as much an autumnal lament for his lost youth as an exploration of a Nietzschean 
farewell to truth, this is the reason for his momentary reproach against life when he 
slips into truth-telling mode, and commits the real crime: the crime of genuineness. 
Or, in Deleuzian terms, our hero – namely Welles – in F for Fake is not actually 
that ‘hero of the power of the false’ that Deleuze would have us believe, but rather 
a more traditional Hollywood hero, the ʻman of truth.’
While both Deleuze and Jonathan Rosenbaum insist on Welles the faker, 
Rosenbaum calling his admissions “projects of candid concealment”,30 and Deleuze 
claiming of this adamantly false cinema that “appearances betray themselves, not 
because they would give way to a more profound truth, but simply because they 
reveal themselves as non-true”,31 the final moments of this essay film or pseudo-
documentary in which we have the grande désillusion, nevertheless refer to the illu-
sionary fraudulent nature of what has gone before as though from a point of truth, 
apparently turning Welles finally back into Deleuze’s truthful man, who “sees in life 
27 Hopkins: “Forgery”, p. 287.
28 Friedrich Nietzsche: “Die fröhliche Wissenschaft”. In: Nietzsche: KSA. Vol. II. 1988, p. 464. 
29 Deleuze: Cinema 2, p. 143.
30 Rosenbaum: Discovering Orson Welles, p. 137.
31 Deleuze: Cinema 2, p. 143.
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an evil, a fault which is to be atoned for: the moral origin of the notion of truth”,32 
as opposed to a Nietzschean.
My question at the end of this contribution is why this volta, why this apparent 
reentry in the final scene of the film into a lethal truth paradigm, thereby betraying 
the higher falsity of a Nietzschean film essay? One is tempted to be bio graphical 
about it, and answer that Welles knew he would soon die, and so the life-affirming 
lie could be sacrificed. But sacrificed to what? What legacy does he leave us with 
this grande désillusion? In the film’s monologue about the anonymous collaborative 
achievement that is Chartres cathedral, Welles seems to offer us a possible reading:
And this has been standing here for centuries. The premier work of man perhaps 
in the whole Western world, and it’s without a signature: Chartres. A celebration 
to God’s glory and to the dignity of man. All that’s left, most artists seem to feel 
these days, is man. Naked, poor, forked radish. There aren’t any celebrations. 
Ours, the scientists keep telling us, is a universe which is disposable. You know, 
it might be just this one anonymous glory of all things, this rich stone forest, this 
epic chant, this gaiety, this grand, choiring shout of affirmation, which we choose 
when all our cities are dust, to stand intact, to mark where we have been, to testify 
to what we had it in us to accomplish.
Our works in stone, in paint, in print, are spared, some of them for a few 
decades or a millennium or two, but everything must finally fall in war or wear 
away into the ultimate and universal ash. The triumphs and the frauds, the 
treasures and the fakes. A fact of life. We’re going to die. “Be of good heart”, 
cry the dead artists out of the living past. Our songs will all be silenced – but 
what of it? Go on singing. Maybe a man’s name doesn’t matter all that much.33
But at the film’s end, Welles has insisted on the individual of the signature and of 
truth and originality. It is as though he cannot bear to become like Chartres, of good 
heart and silent song. His name does matter.
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32 Deleuze: Cinema 2, p. 137.
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